Islam and the threat to western civilisation

I do not think it is an exaggeration to begin this piece with the strong assertion that the greatest threat to western civilization is Islam. On the surface level this is plain to see. An incident which first brought this issue to light was the Salman Rushdie affair. Salman Rushdie, is a British citizen, who wrote a novel which contained the suggestion that the prophet Muhammad may have been tempted by the devil while dictating the Koran. For this, a Fatwa calling for his death was issued by the spiritual leader of Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini. What we saw here essentially, was a leader in an Islamic country offering money for the murder of a citizen of another country. Predictably, the a large proportion of the Muslim world either directly agreed with this, or became apologists for it, saying Rushdie had brought it on himself. To my mind, however, there was something much worse in all of this, namely the reaction of British Liberals. They did not, as one would expect, side with Rushdie and defend freedom of speech, liberty, and democracy. Rather they capitulated to Islamism and criticized Rushdie for causing offense . This seems extraordinary. If, as I do, you believe in liberty, and freedom of expression, you must surely respond to the Islamist's and their Liberal allies with a George Orwell inspired retort "If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear". This essentially means we must defend the right to offend.


A more recent example of a similar phenomenon is the Danish cartoon controversy. This began after 12 editorial cartoons, depicting the prophet Mohammad were published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, on the 30th of September 2005. It is considered blasphemous in most Islamic traditions to depict the Prophet. This led to protests across the middle-east and further a field, which resulted in more than 200 deaths and mass destruction. Yet again, the liberal parties in Denmark, and throughout the west sided with the Islamist's and accused the publishers of xenophobia and Racism. Firstly, even if one hates Islam it cannot be considered Racism. Quite simply you can convert to Islam, therefore, by definition it is not a race, rather it is an ideology. Rather than condemn Islamic barbarity, the Liberals sided with them at the expense of liberty, and freedom of expression. The Islamic world is going to have to understand that the rest of us are under no obligation to respect their religion and have every right to critique and ridicule it as we see fit. The reason this is not xenophobic is because such criticism is not aimed at specific individual Muslims, but rather the ideology of Islam.

What these two episodes illustrate is how Islamic extremists have manipulated the Liberal impulse for tolerance and diversity in their attempts to export their odious ideology into western civilization. This can be witnessed by attempts to pass worldwide blasphemy laws through the UN, essentially making it illegal to criticize religion. This is also evidenced by the setting up of Sharia law courts, especially in Britain, but also across Europe. At this present moment all the right ingredients are there for the destruction of our civilization. A billion strong worldwide Islamic community, a large portion of which intend to either overtly or covertly export their ideology to the west. An Ideology which includes the subordination of women, their demotion to the same status as cattle and the repression of their sexuality. The rejection of science and rationality in favor of a dogmatic seventh century text, which is held up as the unchangeable word of the creator of the universe. And the call to kill all apostates (those who leave the religion). Then we have the liberals who are willing to sacrifice all we hold dear, all our freedoms and liberty's in the name of tolerance and plurality. Furthermore, if one dares to speak out against this trend you are immediately thrown in with far-right racists. What should  be clear is that resisting this current is a defense of enlightenment values of critical thinking, scientific inquiry, freedom of speech, liberty and equality. It is the desire to resist the attempted subjugation of our society by a seventh century barbaric ideology dictated by a pedophilic, psychopathic mass murderer. This is not racism or bigotry it is quite simply the defense of civilization against those who seek its destruction and who wish to see a return to the stone age.

Musings on Christmas

So have a good Christmas?. With all the carols, presents, general festivities and good will, can one really help but get a warm feeling of happiness in their stomach? well I certainly get a feeling in my stomach, though its more of extreme nausea than happiness. The general consensus is that Christmas is a time of joy spent with family and friends, indulging in far too much food and alcohol. Now don't get me wrong I so enjoy food and alcohol, its the rest I have a problem with. My problem simply is that for 1 month each year Ireland, a supposed Western Liberal democracy, becomes the cultural and commercial equivalent of a one-party state. And like any one-party state the propaganda is unavoidable. Walk down any high street, go into any bar, go anywhere outside your house and you'll be met with endless propaganda beseeching you to join in the festivities. If you think I'm being melodramatic here try a simple experiment. Tell someone, anyone that you dislike Christmas. I'll bet any amount of money that their reaction will mirror the reaction of a North Korean upon being told that the Dear Leader isn't really that great. I use the North Korean example, not simply because of my impressive ability to combine international politics and an original opinion of mine into a perfect metaphor, but also because Christmas time is really the only time an Irish person can get a taste of what its like to live in North Korea. Even if you lock yourself in a room for the whole month of December there's no escaping. This is because your siblings or offspring will inevitably bring the propaganda home to you.



But, we haven't got to the best part yet, oh no. The nativity play. Now, can anyone really justify primary school children spending valuable educational time rehearsing for a play that is simply historically untrue. Time that should be taken up with maths and science is spent learning tedious lines of a Babylonian fairy tale. The end result is that while children leave Primary school totally ignorant in relation to the scientific method, they can recite off by heart, such useful songs as "Come all ye faithful". Furthermore, we fool ourselves into thinking that this is at least a good story. Apart, from the fact that most of the story is taken up with a mind-numbingly boring donkey ride, it sends out an appalling moral message. That is, that its okay to take your heavily pregnant wife on a donkey trip half way across the middle-east to fill out a census form. Leaving aside that no person in a Roman controlled territory was ever required to return to their place of birth to fill in a census form, surely we should be teaching children that pregnant women deserve to be treated better than this.


So, all I ask simply is that those of you who insist that your Bronze age myth is the correct one, please organize your ceremonies in private, and stop taking up valuable education time. Don't expect me to celebrate your dear leaders birthday, and certainly don't force me to endure your atrocious carol singers, blinding decorations, and aggressive charity collectors everywhere I go. Also, don't expect to convince me to do something simply by saying "ah gowan its Christmas". Most importantly, don't expect me to be nice to you, don't expect me to be in "the Christmas spirit", and if you wan't to delude yourself into believing Bronze age fairy tales by all means do, just leave me out of it!!!.

Free Will is an illusion

Does free will exist or do we merely have the illusion of free will? I will briefly suggest that due to advances in neuroscience, coupled with logical arguments and anecdotal evidence, it seems free will is an illusion. Our first task is to define what we actually mean by the term free will. Free will is defined as the ability of agents to make choices free from the restraint of outside factors. Recent Neuroscience experiments have suggested that our actions are actually preceded by complex chemical interactions that occur within our brains and outside our conscious awareness. Furthermore, the role of genes, our environment, culture, etc has in shaping our personality and thus our behavior must be considered. In order to prove that free will does not exist though it must be demonstrated that the interplay between external and internal factors which determines our behavior is outside of our conscious control.


   If we examine the issue of free will  from a logical point of view then it becomes clear that it is an illusion. Most people, however, believe that they are the authors of their actions and have a huge amount of control over their choices and subsequently their behavior. Despite this, people will usually agree that they are in some way influenced by their genes, environment and culture, but that they still are in control of every, or most, decisions that they make. This simply cannot be the case for everything you are consciously aware of at this very moment is the result of many factors (genetic, environmental, etc) which are, or were, outside of your conscious control and indeed your conscious awareness. A simple thought experiment should illustrate this point nicely. Simply at random chose a movie (mine was fight club). Now notice that this seems like as free a choice as one could ever hope to have. I set no parameters on your choice, I simply gave you "free reign" to chose whatever movie you wished. On closer inspection, however, we see that you had no more control over this choice than you do over any other. This choice was manufactured by your brain, we know this as a matter of Neurophysiology. The decision you and I made was a result of a chain of causes which were produced within the brain and, therefore, outside of conscious awareness. Contents of consciousness are the results of an unconscious mental life, over which we exert no meaningful amount of control. Another practical example is made by author Sam Harris when he points out, that we cannot chose our next thought for if we could we would have to think about it before we thought of it!.


   We will now examine some Neuro-scientific findings which would appear to undermine the concept of free will. Researcher John-Dylan Haynes states "How can I call a will "mine" if I don't even know when it occurred and what it has decided to do". An experiment carried out by Benjamin Libet in the 1980s asked each subject to flick their wrist while Libet measured their brain activity in relation to this. To determine when the subjects felt the intention to move, he asked them to watch the second hand of a clock and report its position when they felt that they had felt the conscious will to move. Libet found that the unconscious brain activity leading up to the conscious decision by the subject to flick his or her wrist began about 1/2 a second before the subject consciously felt that he or she had decided to move. Notice that if a most basic of decisions is the result of chemical processes within our brain and outside our conscious control than we cant possibly have control over more complex decisions which involve a large degree of random chance. When we consider these implications we see that the idea of free will as defined in the introduction is at its very core illusory.


   In light of these logical and neuro-scientific considerations there is only one other type of free will that can possible be argued for and that is Compatibilism (sometimes called soft-determinism). However, as we will see this too does not stand up to scrutiny. Compatibilism is the belief that free will is compatible with determinism and thus does not contradict our logical and Neuro-scientific objections. Compatibilists state that free will simply means that the agent was not  coerced or restrained in relation to their action or decision. However, this cannot be the case as they are in fact restrained, by things such as biology, environmental factors, culture and random events, which are all outside of their conscious control and quite often outside of conscious awareness. Just because there is no visible external coercion does not mean a person is free to act in a manner consistent with conceptions of free will. Nobody chooses the next thought that will pop into their head or the next emotion that they will experience. It follows then that the Compatibilist view simply cannot be accepted in light of our logical and neuro-scientific objections.


   In conclusion, it has been shown that free will as defined in the introduction is an illusion. Neuroscience has shown that many of our behaviors such as the decision to flick ones right hand as opposed to ones left hand can be seen by researchers via neuro-imaging techniques before the individual becomes consciously aware of their own decision. Furthermore, if we do not decide which genes we are born with, which parents we have, our type of up-bringing, environment, culture etc, than what input can we possible have on the shaping of our personality's. Also since we cannot control the chemical processes within our brains which themselves are fashioned by the aforementioned factors then we cannot consciously control our thoughts or actions and, therefore, no meaningful kind of free will can exist.


 

Do personality disorders exist?

                                                               Do personality disorders exist?

Personality disorders are defined as “enduring pattern[s] of inner experience and behaviour" that are sufficiently rigid and deep-seated to bring a person into repeated conflicts with his or her social and occupational environment” (Hoermann et al, 2011). The aim of this essay is to examine whether or not personality disorders exist. This has been the subject of intense debate among psychologists and other mental health professionals. This is in part due to the fact that this question has far-reaching implications in the clinical, diagnostic, academic and legal domains. Some clinicians welcome the classification of personality disorders as it places previously unrecognised problems into a diagnostic category. Others argue that personality disorders do not exist and are based on social considerations and our very understanding of what a “personality disorder” is, is based on our specific cultural norms. It will be argued in this essay, that from an examination of the research literature, that personality disorders do in fact exist. This argument will involve two steps. Firstly, we will examine the arguments against the existence of personality disorders, particularly the arguments against the existence of Multiple Personality Disorder, so as to demonstrate that they do not stand up to scrutiny. Secondly, we will demonstrate that the research literature shows that personality disorders do in fact exist.

Perhaps the underlying current in the argument that personality disorders do not exist stems from the fact that the idea of personality disorders is often associated with the psychodynamic approach. Following on from this it is asserted that the criteria for Personality disorders was invented without taking clinical realities into consideration (Arntz, 1999). However, this argument does not really stand up given the four basic criterions required for diagnoses of personality disorder. They are:

1. Extreme and distorted thinking patterns
2. Problematic emotional response patterns
3. Impulse control problems
4. Significant interpersonal problems (Hoermann et al, 2011).

What seems clear is that these four diagnostic categories, of which at least two must be filled before a diagnosis can be reached, are fully compatible with clinical realities. Patients presenting with two or more of these symptoms will indeed have personality disorders and, therefore, they are line with clinical realities. Another problem typically associated with the diagnostic process of Personality Disorders is that their definitions are polythetic. However, polythetic definitions are quite common in somatic medicine so there does not seem to be a basis for this argument (Arntz, 1999).

   It has been argued that personality disorders are based on notions of expectations roles and judgements that are deemed to be normal within a given culture (Emergence, 2007). It is further argued that what people today label as personality disorders are no more than the normal personality variations seen within any given culture (Emergence, 2007). While this argument correctly points out that personality disorders are culture specific it does not stand up to scrutiny. First of all just because personality disorders are culture specific does not mean they do not exist. Indeed, it is recognized within the very definition of personality disorders that they are culture specific. Secondly, it is clear that personality disorders are not “normal” deviations of personality. If we take “normal” as meaning a person’s ability to adapt to and cope relatively well within their society, it is clear that personality disorders cannot be seen as the normal variations of personality within a given society. This is made clear when one looks at the four diagnostic categories for personality disorder already outlined in this essay.

   In a research paper published in 1994 Saks et al. outlined some of the main arguments against the existence of Multiple Personality disorder (MPD) (Saks et al, 1994). We will now examine some of these arguments. The first argument outlined here is that many experienced clinicians have not come across a single case of MPD in their careers. This, however, is easily explained. Put simply some clinicians may be better than others at picking up the signs of this personality disorder, given that patients do not always overtly show the signs. Another argument is that such cases are much more frequent than they used to be. This argument is very superficial. It seems obvious to say that this can be explained by pointing out the fact that the disorder has been classified. Now that there is a diagnostic manual to follow clinicians are much more likely to detect the disorder, which previously may have gone undiagnosed. It is argued that many patients report memories of bizarre satanic ritual abuse. It is then claimed that due to this the validity of patients own reports cannot be taken seriously. This is an example of faulty reasoning. At the most basic level this argument asserts that  people with distorted mental functioning cannot be trusted to report truly on matters to do with their own  mental functioning. The final argument outlined in this paper against the existence of MPD is that it appears to be seen predominantly in North America. This argument does not stand up when we examine it more closely. AIDS, as the authors point out, was once basically localised to Africa yet there is nobody who seriously argues that it does not exist. Furthermore, neurosis was once believed to occur only in industrial societies (Saks et al, 1994). Therefore, it has been shown that the arguments against the existence of MPD as outlined in this research paper are not valid.

   We will now turn our attention to the argument that personality disorders do in fact exist. The first point to make is that PD’s can be distinguished from other axis-1 disorders and from one another (Arntz, 1999). This is evidence that personality disorders are actually disorders in their own right and not just exaggerated forms of other disorders. Several researchers say, for example, that avoidant personality disorder is just a severe form of social phobia and, therefore, does not exist in its own right. However, as Arntz has shown in his research paper published in 1999 this is due mainly to a sample bias (Arntz, 1999). Arntz concludes in this research paper that there is very strong evidence that Personality disorders can indeed be distinguished from other Axis-1 disorders. The main problem seems to occur when therapists deviate from the DSM diagnostic procedures. It is, therefore clear that personality disorders are indeed disorders in their own right, which is evidence of their existence.

   Arguments against personality disorders have stated that ideas about what personality disorder actually is are based on roles and expectations about what is perceived to be “normal” within a culture (Emergence, 2007). However, Berghuis et al have shown that “normal” specific personality traits (SPT) can clearly be distinguished from general personality disorders (GPD) (Berghuis et al, 2012). Therefore, GPD and SPT are clearly distinct components of personality. Berghuis et al conducted an experiment as a way of demonstrating this. Data for this experiment was collected by several psychiatric centres in Holland. There were 424 subjects of which 370 were outpatients. The study had 117 men and 307 women aged 17-66 (Berghuis et al, 2012). The GAPD questionnaire was used. This questionnaire operationalizes the main parts of personality pathology (Berghuis et al, 2012). The results of this study show that GPD related dysfunctioning can be meaningfully distinguished from SPT. This shows that GPD is far more than just an extreme version of the normal variations in personality seen in any given population. This is further evidence for the existence of personality disorders.

   As a means of arguing for the existence of personality disorders in general we will now show that Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) does in fact exist. Saks et al has demonstrated this very well (Saks et al, 1994). Through the use of psychological tests it has been shown that the different personalities within a patient with MPD do indeed differ from one another (Saks et al, 1994). Each personality tested consistently throughout the tests, both within individual tests and from one test to the others (Saks et al, 1994). This on its own is, of course, not conclusive evidence for the existence of MPD as personality tests are open to manipulation. In light of this we will now look at the issue of memory tests as a means of proving the existence of MPD. Memory tests are important because people with MPD claim to have amnesia across personalities i.e. one personality cannot remember what the other(s) have done (Saks et al, 1994). Tests indicate though that Neutral information does seem to be retained. Furthermore, Ludwig at al. found that subjects do experience a practice effect. However, subjects tend not to remember affectively-laden information but, rather emotionally-laden information. It seems here that memory tests do not add weight to the claim that MPD exists. However, this is because individuals with MPD have highly disturbed thought processes and it seems, therefore, difficult to see how they could score with any level of consistency on memory tests. The best way to either prove or disprove the existence of MPD seems to be with physiological tests. In a study of optical differences in which Miller compared 9 MPD patients with 9 controls who were role playing MPD, on 8 optical measures, in 4 different areas of vision, the multiples showed greater variability in visual functioning across personalities than did the controls (Saks et al, 1994).  This is very strong evidence for the existence of MPD, especially when coupled with the evidence form psychological tests.

  Personality disorders can be conceptualised using the five-factor model of personality (FFM). This lends evidence to the argument that personality disorders exist. In a study by Saulsman et al it was shown that personality disorders can be conceptualised within the FFM (Saulsman et al, 2002). In this meta-analytical study Psychinfo and Medline databases were consulted in order to obtain all the relevant information. The findings demonstrated that personality disorders can indeed be conceptualised using the FFM, in a way that is “meaningful and predictable given their diagnostic criteria” (Saulsman et al, 2002). The fact that personality disorders can be conceptualised contradicts the argument that they were simply invented and are not in line with clinical realities. The fact that they can be conceptualised within the FFM and have their own diagnostic criteria (as per the DSM) shows that personality disorders do in fact exist and are extremely helpful in a clinical setting.

   It has, therefore, been argued that personality disorders do exist. Arguments against the existence of personality disorder have been examined and it has been shown that they do not stand up to scrutiny. By showing that PD’s can be distinguished from other Axis-1 disorders we can see that they’re disorders in their own right. By demonstrating that GPD and SPT are distinct features of personality we can see that GPD is not just an exaggeration of “normal” SPT. Furthermore, the existence of MPD lends credence to the existence of PD’s in general as the arguments against all PD’s are very similar. Finally, by showing that PD’s can be conceptualised within the FFM it has been shown that they are coherent, empirically sound concepts. All this shows that personality disorders do in fact exist.

                                            References

1.      Hoermann, S; Zupanick, C; Dombeck, M. (January 2011). The definition of a personality disorder. Mentalhelp.net. Accessed on the 15/02/2013. < http://www.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=doc&id=474>.

2.      Arntz, A. (1999). Do personality disorders exist? On the validity of the concept and its cognitive-behavioural formulation in treatment. Behaviour research and therapy., Vol 37. Pp. S97-S134.

3.      Emergence. (2009). Why are personality disorders controversial diagnoses?. Emergence. 10/02/2013. < http://www.emergenceplus.org.uk>

4.      Saks, R. (1994). Does multiple personality disorder exist? The beliefs, the data, and the law. International journal of law and psychiatry, Vol 17(1). Pp. 43-78.

5.      Berghuis, H; Kamphuis, H; Verheul, R. (2012). Core features of personality disorder: Differentiating general personality dysfunctioning from personality traits. Journal of personality disorders, Vol 26(5). Pp. 704-716.

6.      Saulsman, L; Page, A. (2004). The five factor model and personality disorder empirical literature: A meta-analytic review, Vol 23(8). Pp. 1055-1085.

The origins of the Cold War

                                                                        Historiography of the origins of the cold war

Many historians have given vastly different accounts of the origins of the cold war. Often these interpretations have been grounded in philosophical and ideological viewpoints[1]. What is very important in any essay relating to cold war historiography is to realise that each interpretation relies a certain amount on the perceptions, biases and background of the author. Given the wide variety of work on the origins of the cold war and the wide variety of historians writing about it, together with its contemporary significance, it is not difficult to see why a consensus has not yet emerged. This essay will explain the origins of the cold war with reference to the historiography. It will also offer an opinion on which interpretation is most convincing. The oldest school of thought in relation to the origins of the cold war is the orthodox interpretation. At its most basic level this argument states that the Soviet Union was an expansionist totalitarian regime, which was determined to achieve world domination. This interpretation therefore puts the blame for the origins of the cold war onto the Soviet Union and its expansionist tendencies, particularly in Eastern Europe. For at least a decade after the Second World War this was the proscribed view of the American government and was accepted by historians. William Appleman Williams was the first historian to challenge this consensus in his book “The tragedy of American diplomacy”. In this book it was argued that Americans had always been an empire building society and that they were at fault for the origins of the cold war[2]. Later revisionist historians generally agreed with Williams, though, there were some differences. Revisionists blame the origins of the cold war on America. They see American commitment towards an “open door” policy and democracy, as well as a hostile attitude and failure to understand legitimate Soviet security concerns as the root cause of the cold war. The third broad school of thought on the origins of the cold war is the “post-revisionist” school. This argument challenges both the revisionist and orthodox accounts, while accepting some of their findings. The post-revisionist argument is less concerned with apportioning blame and more concerned with how perception, ideology, and mis-interpretation as well as post-war conditions brought on the origins of the cold war. Post-revisionists have also moved away from the idea of the cold war being a bi-polar conflict and taken into account the roles played by other countries. In this essay all three interpretations will be outlined in detail. It will also be argued that while all three interpretations have strengths and weaknesses that the post-revisionist interpretation is the most satisfying.

   We will first address the Orthodox argument for the origins of the cold war. In discussing this we will refer to two main arguments, as well as other arguments and primary documents where appropriate. Firstly, the argument put forward by C. Earl Edmondson and Ralph Levering in the book “Debating the cold war: American and Russian perspectives”. Secondly, we will look at the argument put forward by John Lewis Gaddis in his book “The United States and the Origins of the Cold War: 1941-1947”. These two arguments were chosen for the following reasons: Edmondson and Levering’s account, though not strictly an orthodox one, does outline the major points seen in early orthodox accounts. Gaddis’ argument on the other hand is a much more sophisticated argument and takes a broader look at the origins of the cold war. However, even though he does admit America made mistakes and focuses much more on American domestic affairs as a contributing factor to the onset of cold war, he ultimately places the blame for the origins of the cold war on the Soviet Union. We will now look at the two arguments separately. According to Edmondson and Levering the genesis of the conflict lay in the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union’s two systems contrasted sharply. America was a country which had freedom of the press and everyone had the right to freedom of speech. This contrasted sharply with Russia where total domination of the news and suppression of dissent was seen as acceptable[3]. Also there was tension due to the Soviet Union’s commitment to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Orthodox historians have pointed out that this doctrine was the anti-thesis of American ideals of liberty, equality, and freedom. Also it was extremely hostile to Capitalism and had as its main goal, the overthrow of the international capitalist system, and replacing it with Marxist-Leninist Communism. However, despite this it is pointed out that many Americans felt that post-war co-operation was indeed possible. Orthodox historians point out that this feeling of optimism was finally abandoned due to Soviet expansionism, especially in Eastern Europe[4]. Thomas A. Bailey agrees with this view and puts the origins of the cold war down to Soviet expansionism in the years subsequent to World War II[5]. Soviet expansionism was completely contrary to the Atlantic charter which declared the desire to see “no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned”[6]. Following on from this it is argued that due to Soviet expansionism into Eastern Europe the United States had to act in accordance with the Atlantic charter. The Truman doctrine then is seen as a direct response to Soviet expansionism. It is, therefore, clear that Orthodox Historians put the origins of the cold war down to Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe, Soviet commitment to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of world revolution and the overthrow of the Capitalist system. America then had to act according to the Atlantic charter and attempt to contain Soviet expansion. The Truman doctrine then was a direct response to the actions of the Soviet Union.

   We will now turn our attention towards John Lewis Gaddis’ argument. Gaddis argues that American policy was shaped by an intense desire not to repeat mistakes of the past and thus prevent another war[7]. Victory in World War II would mean absolutely nothing if the post-war conditions did not prevent the rise of future totalitarian regimes. Therefore, a key requirement for peace would be the promotion of peace and self-determination for all people[8]. Gaddis does differ from the traditional orthodox interpretation in that he does take Russian security interests into account. However, he argues that this need for security along with traditional Russian xenophobia and commitment to the Communist ideology made Russia become extremely paranoid of Western motives and led to them expanding into Eastern Europe. Gaddis points out that the main problem in Easter Europe was the differing interpretations assigned to the democratic guarantees written into the Yalta agreement in Russia and America[9]. Gaddis along with other Orthodox historians disagrees with the view that it was Truman who effectively led the US to the cold war by abandoning FDR’s policy of co-operation. Gaddis recognises that Truman’s “abrasive personality” may well have left a bad impression on the Russians, but Truman in reality had no intention of dropping FDR’s policy of co-operation. Gaddis traces the origins of the cold war in a very gradual and careful manner. Disagreements in Eastern Europe, over reparations in Germany, forced the United States into conflict with the Russians. Gaddis Stresses the importance of the Long Telegram in giving Washington officials a justification for a “get tough with Russia policy” that they had been gravitating towards for some time due to Soviet violations of the Atlantic charter in Eastern Europe and excessive demands in relation to German reparations[10]. In many ways Keenan’s long telegram encapsulates the argument put forward by Orthodox historians. Keenan argued that the Soviet regime depended on foreign threats abroad and suppression at home as well as friendly governments in Eastern Europe for its survival, the latter in the Soviet Union’s view at least[11]. Therefore, if one accepts this the United States had no option to pursue a policy of containment. The Soviet Union was relentlessly expanding into Eastern Europe, was completely opposed to the essence of the Atlantic charter, encapsulated within ideas that Americans held dear and was wedded to a Communist ideology which was hell-bent on world domination.

   We will now examine the merits of the Orthodox argument. The traditional Orthodox argument put forward by historians such as Thomas A. Bailey, Arthur Schlesinger Jr, and Herbert Feis and outlined by Edmondson and Levering largely accept the official government explanation. They correctly point out that the Soviet Union was indeed expansionist and that this proved problematic to the United States. However, this interpretation is simply too one-dimensional. By simply focusing on Russian expansionism it becomes mono-casual and neglects to look at the bigger picture. Also it takes a bi-polar view of the cold war and ignores the very important role Britain, for example, played. Also it does not take into account domestic factors within the US which may have led to the cold war. Furthermore, it fails to consider whether or not American determination to impose an “open door” policy on the liberated countries of Europe as outlined in the Atlantic charter[12] may have been a contributing factor towards the origins of the cold war. John Lewis Gaddis did address many of these issues in his book. In relation to the revisionist argument that an American “open door” policy was a main factor in the origins of the cold war he states that this neglects to look at the profound impact the domestic political system had on how America conducted its foreign policy. Gaddis also takes into account a broader spectrum of issues when looking at the origins of the cold war. After examining all these factors Gaddis concludes that America did not want a cold war but wanted insecurity even less and were thus forced into the cold war due to Russia’s actions[13]. While it is certainly true that Gaddis’ book is certainly the most sophisticated amongst Orthodox accounts it still suffers from many of the pitfalls of the traditional orthodox accounts. Gaddis’ seems to argue that no matter what the US did, the Soviets were still at fault for the Cold War. A major problem with Gaddis’ work is that he views Soviet policy as almost solely reactionary. This of course neglects to understand that Soviet policy had its own dynamics. Gaddis does show that Truman and Roosevelt were worried about congressional support and also highly concerned with public opinion, but he fails to support his assertion that different policies would not have worked[14]. All in all it seems that though Gaddis work is very strong in some respects, it must still be rejected along with the Orthodox interpretation as a whole.

   Now we will turn our attention towards examining the arguments put forward by Revisionist historians. In doing so we will focus on 3 main arguments, as well as referring to other arguments and primary documents, where deemed necessary. Firstly, we will look at the argument put forward by Michael Hunt in his book "Ideology and US foreign policy". Secondly, we will look at the work of Walter LaFeber in his book "America, Russia, and the cold war, 1945-1996.". Finally, we will look at the argument put forward by Thomas J. McCormick in his book "America's half-century: United States foreign policy in the cold war and after". Hunt argues that American foreign policy has throughout all of American history been driven by ideology and, therefore, American foreign policy during the cold war was driven by that inherited ideology[15]. This Ideology according to hunt has three components: Firstly, there is what has been termed "manifest destiny". This is a belief in American greatness and exceptionalism, which is used to justify American expansionism. Secondly, there is the notion of a racial hierarchy, with whites at the top, blacks at the bottom and every other race somewhere in between. Thirdly, there is the fear of revolutions which do not conform to the shape that the American Revolution took[16]. US diplomacy according to Hunt has been shaped by a powerful ideology rooted in the 18th and 19th century. Cold war policy although it saw an increased assertiveness by American policy-makers, and was more global than previously seen, was essentially still driven by that inherited ideology[17]. Hunt then sees the origins of the cold war in America’s inability to escape the confines of that ideology and American inability to interpret unfolding events outside of that ideological framework.

   LaFeber agrees with Hunt's analysis to a certain extent, but also differs from him in other respects. Lafeber agrees with Hunt's assertion that American policy in the 18th and 19th century was driven by a belief in manifest destiny, which he describes as a "supernatural force" which directed their conquests"[18]. However, in relation to the origins of the cold war LaFeber's argument is more economically orientated as opposed to ideological. His analysis traces the origins of the conflict back to the 1890's when the two nations first clashed over Manchuria. Americans believed that their prosperity was contingent on an "open door" policy in Manchuria. However, the Russians were determined to close off parts of Manchuria. This conflict according to LaFeber came to a head after World War II. Washington officials still haunted by the memory of the Great Depression believed that another economic crisis could only be avoided by having fully open global markets. There was a determination in Washington to prevent the tariff barriers and trading blocs which prevailed during the 1930s[19]. As one commentator pointed out "The capitalist system is an international system, and if it cannot function internationally, it will break down completely"[20]. Indeed article four of the Atlantic charter would seem to back up LaFeber's assertion that American policy was influenced heavily by economic considerations. It states that all nations should have "access, on equal terms, to the trade and to raw materials of the world which are needed for their prosperity"[21]. Furthermore, it is clear that this view of American foreign policy considerations was accepted by the Russians. In the Novikov telegram of September, 1946 it is asserted that "The foreign policy of the United States, which reflects the imperialist tendencies of American capital, is characterized in the post-war period by a striving for world supremacy"[22]. It is important to point out that LaFeber did not believe that this economic conflict was bi-polar. Indeed, he points out that the British and French were as determined as the Russians to close their "spheres of influence" to the Americans. However, given the relative weakness of both countries in the post-war years it is clear that there was significantly less tension between these countries and America than between Russia and America. This line of argument concludes then that due to the American "open door" policy, relations with Russia declined drastically and ultimately led to the Cold War. As William Clayton, state department economic adviser said:“nations which act as enemies in the market place cannot long be friends at the council table"[23].

   McCormick argues that from the latter part of World War II and until the Vietnam War, American hegemony was the main force in world affairs[24]. His analysis of the cold war is within the paradigm of world systems theory espoused by Immanuel Wallerstein. This theory sees the world as having three types of world systems. They are, the capitalist world system, the external world system and then there are mini-systems of subsistence communities[25]. According to this theory the first system grows continuously at the expense of the other systems. Within the capitalist system there are three zones: the core, within which most of the high-tech, high-profit enterprise resides; the periphery, which specializes in primary production; and finally the semi-periphery, a kind of intermediate zone which carries out functions such as transport, etc[26]. According to McCormick America is the most powerful core country. They have pursued a policy which aims to force nations outside of the capitalist world system to abandon their national economic controls in favour of a free trade "open-door" economic system. Due to this policy America has found it necessary to become the world police and ensure that ground rules of internationalism are not broken by any country. Herein, according to McCormick, lie the origins of the cold war. As Russia resisted this policy they found themselves in conflict with an economically expansionist United States.

   It should be clear at this stage that the "Revisionist" argument cannot be viewed as a monolithic one. Indeed, within the school of thought broadly described as “Revisionist” there are many different interpretations, some of which have been outlined. Indeed it seems the main thing these interpretations have in common is that they reject the Orthodox view. Michael Hunt's book is an exceptional piece of scholarly work in that it traces American ideology from the origins of American foreign policy up to almost the present day. In doing so he does indeed point out the very important impact ideology has had on US foreign policy. This fresh approach did indeed show that American policymakers were not always simply reacting to Russian actions as many Orthodox accounts would have us believe, but did in fact have a pre-existing ideological paradigm within which they viewed the world. However, the main problem with Hunt's analysis is that it underestimates the ability of American policymakers to go against ideology when dealing with issues of national interest. It seems that in trying to make his case Hunt cherry-picks evidence to suit his point of view and ignores evidence which contradicts it. In essence Hunt focuses only on ideology and completely ignores the national interest aspect of foreign policy. Walter LaFeber succeeds greatly in pointing out how economic considerations greatly shaped US foreign policy. In assessing LaFeber's book it is difficult to find anything major to quibble about. Rather where his analysis fails to convince is not in what is said, but rather what is omitted. LaFeber focuses on the economic argument too much, without really engaging with how Russian actions, coupled with American desires not to allow the mistakes they made with Hitler to be repeated, influenced policy thinking. In this sense LaFeber puts forward a good economic argument for the origins of the Cold War, but without taking into account other factors his argument is too mono-casual. McCormick’s argument is a well-argued theoretical one. Yet it suffers many of the pit-falls associated with World Systems Theory in general. The theory focuses too much on economics and neglects other important issues. In a scientific sense it offers little in the way of quantitative evidence. Also the theory cannot be falsified by any observational or evidence based techniques due to it being grounded almost completely in abstraction[27].

   We will now turn our attention to the post-revisionist argument. In examining this argument it is important to keep certain details in mind. Post-revisionism is a very large school of thought and thus encapsulates many different arguments and aspects of Cold War historiography. Also it is important to note that no one historian’s post-revisionist argument is in itself comprehensive enough to account for the origins of the cold war. For example John Kent has argued that British foreign policy manoeuvring played a very important role in contributing to the origins of the Cold War, David Reynolds has argued that the exigencies of European politics after World War II played a key role in raising tensions which eventually led to the Cold War. Other arguments have centred on the Atomic bomb as a major contributing factor towards the onset of Cold War. What can be broadly said about post-revisionism though is that it argues for a multi-polar, multi-casual, and generally comprehensive explanation for the origins of the Cold War when all the different arguments within the school of thought are brought together. We will now examine a few. Melvyn P. Leffler argues that after World War II the United States had a clear idea of how they would achieve national security. This idea of national security was influenced by the experiences of the war and it was also believed that it was in direct conflict with the strategic goals of the Soviet Union[28]. US officials did hope to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union but also did not wish the Eurasian land mass to fall under Soviet influence[29]. Defence in depth was seen as being vitally important to US strategic interests especially after Pearl Harbour. Leffler then paints a picture of US strategic goals after World War II being in total contrast to Soviet strategic goals and, therefore, this contributed massively to the origins of the Cold War. Geoffrey Roberts does much to discredit the Orthodox view that it was Soviet expansionism and Stalin's paranoia which were the sole factors behind the Cold War. He points to Teheran in 1943, where Stalin, joined Churchill and Roosevelt in a joint pledge for an enduring peace[30]. Roberts also shows how Stalin was committed to a "Three policemen" world order by demonstrating that his public pronouncements on such a policy were often in line with his private musings[31]. All this shows that the origins of the Cold War, far from being all the fault of Stalin and the Soviet Union, was in fact much more complex than the Orthodox historians argue.

   An analysis of the policies Roosevelt choose with the ones he did not chose shows that the Atomic bomb featured in his thinking on foreign policy[32]. These policies were based on the assumption that as America now had the bomb they would be more or less able to shape the post-war world to their liking[33]. The previous has been argued by Martin J. Sherwin. He goes on to argue that it was Churchill's influence that convinced Roosevelt that the bomb could be a powerful diplomatic tool, especially in countering the Soviet Union. Those who conducted diplomacy became more confident now that American achievements in building the bomb could be used to make the post-ear world a better one than the pre-war world. It is finally argued that when the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki that this was the culmination of a process which transformed American foreign policy into a one which would deeply threaten the Soviet Union and contributed to the origins of the Cold War. John Kent has done much to shed light on the pivotal role played by Britain in relation to the origins of the Cold War. He argues that Britain’s Cold War policy was a major cause for growing tensions in 1945 and consequently a major element in the origins of the Cold War[34]. British perceptions of the importance of their colonial possessions in Africa influenced their overall Cold War policy in ways which would increase tensions massively in the years 1947-48[35]. British strategic thinkers in this period viewed the Soviet Union as a massive challenge to British strategic thinking and thereby could not accept them as a friendly power. These imperial instincts were reinforced by their intense dislike of Communism. Councillor Gladwyne Jebb captured British policy best according to Kent when he proclaimed "to yield to any Russian demand would clearly mean that we were not prepared to play the part of a great power"[36]. However, Kent is quick to point out that British actions were not intended to create an anti-Soviet bloc with the United States but rather re-establish Britain as a major player on the world stage. He concludes by stating that although Britain contributed to the origins of the Cold War they cannot be held solely responsible for the break-down in Allied co-operation[37]. David Reynolds, like Kent, has demonstrated that the Cold War cannot be seen as a Bi-Polar conflict. He argues that the European dimension to the Cold War's origins was vitally important. He points out that there were large Communist parties in Europe which worried the United States. For example, in France Communist membership was roughly 1 million by 1945 and 1.7 million in Italy in the same year. Furthermore, Hungary had 500,000 members in its communist party by 1945 and Czechoslovakia had 1.2 million[38]. Amazingly these parties were outside of Soviet influence and in fact caused the Soviet Union much worry[39]. This shows how perception contributed heavily towards the origins of the cold war. By failing to see the divisions within Communism and by viewing it as a monolithic organization, America may have unwittingly followed policies which raised tensions unnecessarily. Reynolds indeed focuses a lot on perception and claims that U.S and British failures to understand German fears over Germany and Soviet inability to understand American fears contributed heavily to the origins of the Cold War[40].

   These arguments found in the book "Origins of the cold war: an international history", provide the most comprehensive and convincing explanation for the origins of the Cold War. When taken together they focus on Geopolitics, threat perception, ideology, strategic concern as well as painting the cold war as a multi-polar conflict. Some critics have dismissed post-revisionism as "Orthodoxy plus archives"[41]; however, this is much too simplistic. Post-revisionists do not simply attempt to use new archival material to shore up or advance the Orthodox view, indeed as has been shown in this essay, many are critical of US Cold War policy. The essence of post-revisionism is to take a broader, more systematic view of the origins of the Cold War and accepting that no one country was to blame. While it may be the case that too broad an outlook may result in missing important detail it surely is the only way that can truly account for the origins of the cold war. What Revisionists and Orthodox historians fail to understand is that no one country, ideology or strategic goal alone can control the complexities of World diplomacy. It is only by illuminating the fact that the World is a bi-polar place with many competing ideologies and strategic interests and it is only by looking at all the players within this complex web, assessing their intentions, motivations and actions that the origins of the cold war can be understood completely. While the post-revisionist school may not yet have completely achieved this, and while a consensus is yet to emerge, this interpretation when taken as the sum of all its parts is certainly the best explanation currently available.

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[1] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Pp.1

[2] William.A.Williams. The tragedy of American diplomacy. W W Norton & Company Incorporated, 1988.

[3] C. Earl Edmondson, Ralph B. Levering, Vladimir D. Pechatnov, Verena Botzenhart- Viehe. Debating the origins of the cold war: American and Russian perspectives. Rowman & Littlefield publishers inc, United States of America. 2001.

[4] C. Earl Edmondson, Ralph B. Levering, Vladimir D. Pechatnov, Verena Botzenhart- Viehe. Debating the origins of the cold war: American and Russian perspectives. Rowman & Littlefield publishers inc, United States of America. 2001.

[5] Alan Brinkley. American history a survey. McGraw-Hill, New York. 1986. Pp. 798.

[6] Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston S. Churchill. The Atlantic Charter. Behind closed doors: Stalin, the Nazi’s and the west. Accessed 05-02-13. < www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/pdfs/TheAtlanticConference.pdf>

[7] John Lewis Gaddis. The united states and the origins of the cold war 1941-47. COLUMBIA University Press, 1972.

[8] John Lewis Gaddis. The united states and the origins of the cold war 1941-47. COLUMBIA University Press, 1972.

[9] John Lewis Gaddis. The united states and the origins of the cold war 1941-47. COLUMBIA University Press, 1972.

[10] John Lewis Gaddis. The united states and the origins of the cold war 1941-47. COLUMBIA University Press, 1972.

[11] George F. Keenan. “The Long-Telegram”, February 22, 1946. [Accessed on 28-02-2013]. < www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/.../pdf/6-6.pdf>.

[12] Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston S. Churchill. The Atlantic Charter. Behind closed doors: Stalin, the Nazi’s and the west. Accessed 05-02-13. < www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/pdfs/TheAtlanticConference.pdf>

[13] John Lewis Gaddis. The united states and the origins of the cold war 1941-47. COLUMBIA University Press, 1972.

[14] John Lewis Gaddis. The united states and the origins of the cold war 1941-47. COLUMBIA University Press, 1972.

[15] Michael Hunt. Ideology and U.S foreign policy. Yale university press. April, 2009.

[16] Michael Hunt. Ideology and U.S foreign policy. Yale university press. April, 2009.

[17] Michael Hunt. Ideology and U.S foreign policy. Yale university press. April, 2009. Pp 150.

[18] Walter Lafeber. America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1996. McGraw-Hill, New York. 1997.

[19] Walter Lafeber. America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1996. McGraw-Hill, New York. 1997.

[20] Walter Lafeber. America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1996. McGraw-Hill, New York. 1997.

[21] Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston S. Churchill. The Atlantic Charter. Behind closed doors: Stalin, the Nazi’s and the west. Accessed 05-02-13. < www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/pdfs/TheAtlanticConference.pdf>

[22] Viacheslav Molotov. “The Novikov Telegram, 27 September 1946”. [Accessed on 09-03-2013]. < http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/novikov.htm>.

[23] Walter Lafeber. America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1996. McGraw-Hill, New York. 1997.

[24] Thomas J. McCormick. America’s half-century: United States foreign policy in the Cold War and after. Second edition. John Hopkins University press, Baltimore. 1995.

[25] Thomas J. McCormick. America’s half-century: United States foreign policy in the Cold War and after. Second edition. John Hopkins University press, Baltimore. 1995.

[26] Thomas J. McCormick. America’s half-century: United States foreign policy in the Cold War and after. Second edition. John Hopkins University press, Baltimore. 1995.

[27] Immanuel Wallerstein. “World systems analysis”. Encyclopedia  of life support systems. 2004.

[28] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Chapter 1.

[29] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Chapter 1.

[30] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Chapter 2.

[31] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Chapter 2

[32] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Chapter 3

[33] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Chapter 3

[34] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Chapter 8

[35] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Chapter 8

[36] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Chapter 8

[37] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Chapter 8

[38] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Chapter 9

[39] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Chapter 9

[40] Melvyn P.Leffler, David S.Painter. The origins of the cold war: an international history. Second edition. Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York. 1994. Chapter 9

[41] John Harper. The Cold War. Oxford university press, New York. 2011. Pp. 87.